Report to the Council and the Commission on the realisation by stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community - "Werner Report" - (definitive text) [8 October 1970]. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 11/1970 by Werner, Pierre.
COUNCIL - COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Report to the Council and the Commission
on the realisation by stages of
ECONOMIC  AND MO.NETARY  UNION
in the Community
(( 
Werner Report))
(definitive text)
Supplement to Bulletin II - 1970
of the European CommunitiesCOUNCIL  COMMISSION
of the European Communities
Report to the Council and the Commission
on the realization by stages
of economic and monetary union 
the Community
same as document 16. 956/II/70~ , 8 October 1970
Luxembourg
8 October 1970Summary
Foreword
I. Introduction
II. Starting point
III. The final objective
IV. The principles of realization of the plan by stages
V. The first stage
VI. The transition towards the final objective
VII. Conclusions
Annex 1: Communique from The Hague
Annex 2: The Group s mandate
Annex 3: Composition of the Group
Annex 4: Decision of the Council of 8 and 9 June 1970
Annex 5: Report transmitted by the Committee of Governors
of the central banks of the EEC on questions put by
the  ad hoc  Committee presided over by Mr Werner
and annexes.
The following pages in this document were blank: 2 , 4 , 6 , 31.
S. 11 - 1970
PageFOREWORD
The present report completes the work of the group set up under
Mr Pierre Werner, the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the
Luxembourg Government, to look into the various aspects of the realization by
stages of economic and monetary union in the Community.
In order to preserve unity in the presentation of the text it has been
decided to combine in a single report the aspects that were considered in the
interim report dated 20 May 1970 and those studied subsequently. Chapters I:
introduction; II: starting point; and IV: the principles of realization of the plan
by stages, have been taken to a large extent from the interim report. The
same applies to chapter III: the final objective, except as regards the institutional
reforms. On the other hand chapters V: the first stage; VI: the transition
towards the final objective; and VII: conclusions, are almost completely new.
Consequently, the present report contains an account of the whole of the work
of the group.
$. 11 - 19701. INTRODUCTION
In accordance with the directives issued by the Conference of Heads of
State or Government held at The Hague on 1 and 1 December 1969 and
in accordance with the mandate given to it by a decision of the Council of
Ministers of 6 March 1970, the Group, presided over by Mr Pierre Werner
the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the Luxembourg Government
presented to the Council of Ministers on 20 May 1970 an interim report on
the realization by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community.
. In response to the invitation of the Council issued during its session of 8 and
9 June 1970 the Group has the honour to present its final report which
completes and amplifies the interim report, in the light in particular of the
directives that emerged from the exchange of views that took place in the course
of the same session.l The present report does not reflect the individual
preferences of the members of the Group but formulates replies in common.
The ideas expressed are given on the personal responsibility of the members
of the Group.
The formulation of the plan by stages presupposes that an examination
will first be made of the present situation, facilitating a precise definition
of the starting point and the development of a common concept of the state of
economic and monetary union upon the completion of the plan by stages.
Thus, having clarified the extreme limits of the development, the report sets out
certain fundamental principles and specific proposals for starting and developing
the process which should lead the Member States to economic and monetary
UnIon.
Without neglecting in any way the final phase of the process, the
Group has thought fit to place particular emphasis on the first stage which
implies concrete and important measures to be taken at the outset.
II. STARTING POINT
Since the signature of the Treaty of Rome, the European Economic
Community has taken several steps of prime importance towards economic
integration. The completion of the customs union and the definition of a
common agricultural policy are the most significant landmarks.
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general economic disequilibrium in the member countries will have direct and
rapid repercussions on the global evolution  of  the Community. The experience
of  recent years has clearly shown that such disequilibrium is likely to com-
promise seriously the integration realized in the liberation  of  the movement 
goods, services and capital. This is particularly true  of  the agricultural common
market. Having regard to the marked differences existing between the member
countries in the realization  of  the objectives  of  growth and stability, there is a
grave danger  of  disequilibria arising if economic policy cannot be harmonized
effectively.
The increasing interpenetration  of  the economies has entailed a weakening
of  autonomy for national economic policies. The control  of  economic policy
has become all the more difficult because the loss  of  autonomy at the national
level has not been compensated by the inauguration  of  Community policies.
The inadequacies and disequilibrium that have occurred in the process 
realization  of  the Common Market are thus thrown into relief.
The efforts expended have made it possible to achieve partial progress
but they have not in fact led to the coordination or effective harmonization 
economic policies in the Community, which would, however, have accorded
with the spirit  of  the Treaty  of  Rome and which could have been realized to
a large extent by the application  of  the fundamental provisions  of  the Treaty
and in particular  of  the articles relating tf) economic and monetary policy.
Quantitative objectives sufficiently harmonized, which are one  of  the
important conditions for effective coordination, have not been achieved in
the first two medium-term programmes. Investigations that have been made
into the economic situation in the Community have often not had any other
result than recommendations formulated in altogether general terms, even
when the Community interest calls for the assumption  of  a more positive
position. In general, the consultation procedures have not yielded the results
expected, either because they have been  of  a purely formal character or because
the Member States have taken refuge in escape clauses.
The extension  of  the liberation  of  movements  of  capital and the realiza-
tion  of  the right  of  establishment and'  of  the free rendering  of  services by
banking and financial undertakings have not progressed far enough. The
delay has been caused by the absence  of  sufficient coordination  of  economic
and monetary policies and by local peculiarities  of  law or  of  fact.
The freedom  of  persons to circulate is not yet assured in an entirely
satisfactory manner and real progress has not yet been accomplished as regards
the harmonization  of  social policies.
In the matter  of  regional policy, policies for particular sectors, and
transport policy the progress realized has so far been fairly modest.
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relations, the Community has not succeeded in making its personality felt
by the adoption  of  common positions, by reason as the case may be 
divergencies  of  policy or  of  concept.
While these gaps have been appearing, economic agents have been
adapting themselves at least partially to the new conditions in the markets.
Thus, multinational companies have been formed and the markets in Euro-
currencies and Euro-currency issues have sprung up and developed considerably.
Furthermore, speculative movements  of  capital have assumed enormous propor-
tions. These developments, some  of  which have positive aspects, help none-
theless to make still more difficult the control  of  economic development by
Member States , while the constantly increasing interdependence 
of  the industrial-
ized economies throws into clearer and clearer relief the problem  of  the
individuality  of  the Community.
The realization  of  the measures advocated in the memorandum  of  the
Commission to the Council  of  12 February 196.9 may give a new impulse
to the efforts  of  coordination and harmonization  of  economic and monetary
policies. The realization  of  these measures, however, only provides a basis
for the construction  of  the economic and monetary union which it is essential
to conclude as soon as possible.
III. THE FINAL OBJECTIVE
The Group has not sought to construct an ideal system in the abstract.
It has set out rather to determine the elements that are indispensable to the
existence  of  a complete economic and monetary union. The union as it is
described here represents the minimum that must be done, and is a stage in a
dynamic evolution which the pressure 
of  events and political will can model
in a different way.
Economic and monetary union will make it possible to realize an area
within which goods and services, people and capital will circulate freely and
without competitive distortions, without thereby giving rise to structural or
regional disequilibrium.
The implementation  of  such a union will effect a lasting improvement
in welfare in the Community and will reinforce the contribution  of  the
Community to economic and monetary equilibrium in the world. It pre-
supposes the cooperation  of  the various economic and social groups so that
by the combined effect  of  the market forces and the policies elaborated and
consciously applied by the authorities responsible there may be achieved sImul-
taneously satisfactory growth, a high 
level  of  employment, and stability. In
addition, the Community policy should tend to- reduce the regional and social
disparities and ensure the protection 
of  the environment.
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convertibility  of  currencies , the elimination  of  margins  of  fluctuation in exchange
rates, the irrevocable fixing  of  parity rates and the complete liberation of
movements  of  capital. It may be accompanied by the maintefiance 
of  national
monetary symbols or the establishment  of  a sole Community currency. From
the technical point  of  view the choice between these two solutions may seem
immaterial, but considerations  of  a psychological and political nature militate
in favour  of  the adoption  of  sole currency which would confirm the
irreversibility  of  the venture.
For such a union only the global balance  of  payments  of  the Community
vis-a-vis the outside world is of any importance. Equilibrium within the
Community would be realized at this stage in the same way as within a
nation s frontiers., thanks to the mobility  of  the factors  of  production and
financial transfers by the public and private sectors.
To ensure the cohesion  of  economic and monetary union, transfers 
responsibility from the national to the Community plane will be essential.
These transfers will be kept within the limits necessary for the effective opera-
tion  of  the Community and will concern essentially the whole body  of  policies
determining the realization  of  general equilibrium. In addition, it will be
necessary for the instruments  of  economic policy to be harmonized in the
various sectors.
Quantitative objectives at medium term 
established in the form  of  projec-
tions compatible with o!le another and with the objects 
of  the Common Market
will be fixed at the Community level for growth, employment, prices and external
equilibrium. These projections will be revised periodically.
Short-term economic policy  will be decided in its broad outlines at a
Community level. For this purpose to appreciate and fix the conditions of
operation on global supply and demand, especially by . means  of  monetary
and budgetary policy, it will be necessary to establish normative and compatible
economic budgets each year and to control their realization.
It is indispensable that the principal decisions in the matter  of monetary
policy  should be centralized, whether it is a question  of  liquidity, rates  of  interest,
intervention in the foreign exchange market, the management  of  the reserves
or the fixing  of  foreign exchange parities vis-a-vis the outside world. The
Community must have at its disposal a complete range  of  necessary instruments
the utilization  of  which, however, may be different from country to country
within certain limits. In addition, it will be necessary to ensure a Community
policy and Community representation in monetary and financial relations with
third countries and international organizations  of  an economic, financial and
monetary nature.
For influencing the general development  of  the economy  budget policy
assumes great importance. The Community budget will undoubtedly be more
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significance will still be weak compared with that  of  the national budgets,
the harmonized management  of  which will be an essential feature  of  cohesion
in the union. '
The margins within which the main budget .aggregates must be held both
for the annual budget and the multi-year projections will be decided at the
Community level, taking account  of  the economic situation and the particular
structural features  of  each country. A fundamental element will be the deter-
mination  of  variations in the volume  of  budgets, the size  of  the balance and the
methods  of  financing deficits or utilizing any surpluses. In order to be able
to influence the short term economic trend rapidly and effectively it will be
useful to have at the national level budgetary and fiscal instruments that can be
handled in accordance with Community directives.
In this field, it is necessary to guard against excessive centralization.
The transfers  of  power to the Community organs must be effected to the extent
necessary for the proper functioning  of  the union, and must allow for a differ-
entiated budgetary structure operating at several levels, Community, national etc. 
To make possible the abolition  of  fiscal frontiers while safeguarding the
elasticity necessary for fiscal policy to be able to exercise its functions at the
various levels a sufficient degree  of fiscal harmonization  will be effected, notably
as regards the value-added tax, taxes likely to have an influence on the move-
ment  of  capital and certain excise duties.
The suppression  of  the obstacles  of  various kinds should make it possible
to arrive at a true  cQmmon market for capital  free from distortions. The
financial policy  of  the Member States must be sufficiently unified to ensure the
balanced operation  of  this market.
The realization  of  global economic equilibri~m may be dangerously
threatened by differences  of  structure. Cooperation between the partners in
the Community in the matter  of structural and regional policies  will help to
surmount these difficulties, just as it will make it possible to eliminate the
distortions  of  competition. The solution  of  the big problems in this field will
be facilitated by financial measures  of  compensation. In an economic and
monetary union, structural and regional policies will not be exclusively a matter
for national budgets. Furthermore, the problems  of  environment raised by
industrial growth and urban development must be treated at the Community'
level under their various technical, financial and social aspects. Finally, the
continuous development  of  intra-Community trade will find a new stimulus
in a suitable transport policy.
The cohesion  of  the economic and monetary union will be the better
safeguarded if the  social partners  are consulted prior to the formulation and the
implementation  of  the Community policy. It -is important to adopt procedures
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this context, in order to avoid the emergence of excessive divergencies, the
trend of incomes in the various member countries will be studied and
discussed at the Community level with the participation of the social partners.
To resume, economic and monetary union implies the following principal
consequences:
the Community currencies will be assured of total and irreversible mutual
convertibility free from fluctuations in rates and with immutable parity
rates, or preferably they will be replaced by a sole Community currency;
the creation of liquidity throughout the area and monetary and credit
policy will be centralized;
monetary policy in relation to the outside world will be within the jurisdic-
tion of the Community;
the policies of the Member States as regards the capital market will be
unified;
the essential features of the whole of the public budgets, and in particular
variations in their volume, the size of balances and the methods of financing
or utilizing them, will be decided at the Community level;
regional and structural policies will no longer be exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the member countries; 
a systematic and continuous consultation between the social partners
will be ensured at the Community level.
A result of this is that on the plane of  institutional reforms  the realization
of economic and monetary union demands the creation or the transformation
of a certain number of Community organs to which powers until then exercised
by the national authorities will have to be transferred. These transfers of
responsibility represent a process of fundamental political significance which
implies the progressive development of political cooperation. Economic and
monetary union thus appears as a leaven for the development of political
union, which in the long run it cannot do without.
The Group does not consider that it will have to formulate detailed
proposals as to the institutional form to be given to the different Community
organs; it nevertheless indicates the principal requirements to be observed by
two organs that seem to it indispensable to the control of economic and monetary
policy inside the union: a centre of' decision for economic policy, and a Com-
munity system for the central banks.
The  centre of decision for economic policy  will exercise independently,
in accordance with the Community interest, a decisive influence over the
general economic policy of the Community. In view of the fact that the role
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Community s centre  of  decision must be in a position to influence the national
budgets, especially as regards the level and the direction  of  the balances and the
methods for financing the deficits or utilizing the surpluses. In addition
changes in the parity  of  the sole currency or the whole  of  the national currencies
will be within the competence  of  this centre. Finally, in order to ensure the
necessary links with the general economic policy i~s responsibility will extend
to other domains  of  economic and social policy which will have been
transferred to the Community level. It is essential that the .centre  of  decision
for economic policy should be in a position to take rapid and effective decisions
by methods to be specified, especially as regards the way in which the Member
States will participate.
The transfer to the Community level  of  the powers exercised hitherto
by national authorities will go hand-in-hand with the transfer  of  a corresponding
Parliamentary responsibility from the national plane to that 
of  the Community.
The centre  of  decision  of  economic policy will be politically responsible to a
European Parliament. The latter will have to be furnished with a status
corresponding to the extension  of  the Community missions, not only from the
point  of  view  of  the extent  of  its powers, but also having regard to the
method  of  election  of  its members.
The constitution  of  the Community system for the central banks could
be based on organisms  of  the type  of  the Federal Reserve System operating
in the United States. This Community institution will be empowered to take
decisions , according to the requirements  of  the economic situation, in the
matter  of  internal monetary policy as regards liquidity, rates 
of  interest, and the
granting  of  loans to public and private sectors. In the field  of  external
monetary policy, it will be empowered to intervene in the foreign exchange
market and the management  of  the monetary reserves  of  the Community.
The transfer  of  powers to the Community level from the national centres
of  decision raises a certain number  of  political problems. In this respect it
is fitting to quote in particular the relationship between the centre  of  decision
for economic policy and the Community system  of  central banks as well as
that between the Community organs and the national authorities. While
safeguarding the responsibilities proper to each it will be necessary to guarantee
that the Community organ competent for economic policy and that dealing
with monetary problems are aiming at the same objectives.
A deeper study  of  the institutional problems thus raised is outside the
framework  of  the mission  of  the Group, which has, however, thought it necessary
to raise the essential aspects.
The implementation  of  economic and monetary union demands institu-
tional reforms which presuppose a modification  of  the Treaties  of  Rome.
Certainly, the present provisions already allow substantial progress to be made
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be necessary eventually to make possible a more advanced development 
transfers  of  responsibility and the progressive establishment  of  the final
institutions.
The Group considers that economic and monetary union is an objective
realizable in the course  of  the present decade, provided the political will  of  the
Member States to realize this objective, solemnly declared at the Conference
at The Hague, is present.
IV. THE PRINCIPLES OF REALIZATION OF
THE PLAN BY STAGES
In describing the desired result the Group intended to establish with
clarity and precision the final objective aimed at. It is essential that there
should be no misunderstanding in this matter, for economic and monetary
unification is an irreversible process which must be approached with the firm
intention to pursue it to its conclusion in the acceptance  of  all the implications
contained in it on the economic and political plane.
The Group in no way wishes to suggest that economic and monetary
union are realizable without transition. The union must, on the contrary, be
developed progressively by the prolongation  of  the measures already taken for
the reinforcement  of  the coordination  of  economic policies and monetary
cooperation.
In every field the steps to be taken will be interdependent and will
reinforce one another; in particular the development  of  monetary unification
must be based on sufficient progress in the field  of  convergence and then in that
of  the unification  of  economic policies. Parallel to the limitation  of  the auton-
omy  of  the Member States in the matter  of  economic policy it will be necessary
to develop corresponding powers at the Community level.
While pursuing its economic and monetary unification the Community
will have to declare, vis-a.-vis the outside world, its own objectives  of  inter-
national political economy. It is important ' that in adapting its internal
structures it should continue to participate through the member countries or
by itself in the measures for the liberation  of  trade, economic and monetary
cooperation, and aid to developing countries that are decided on at the world
level. Under these conditions, economic and monetary union will have served
to reinforce the international division  of  labour and not to establish a new
autarkic bloc within the world economy.
The Communique from The Hague envisages that the plan by stages for
economic and monetary union will be formulated " on the basis  of  the memoran-
dum presented by the Commission on 12 February 1969". The Group there-
S. 11 - 1970fore considers that the actions advocated in the memorandum constitute the
starting point for the whole process and that it is essential in consequence that
the Council should pronounce before the end  of  1970 on the only elements
still outstanding in the memorandum, that is to say, on the one hand, the
third medium-term programme setting out guidelines supported by figures
and structural measures and, on the other hand, financial aid at medium term.
On the basis  of  these principles, the Group has first  of  all set out to
clarify the principal measures to be considered in the course  of  the first stage
for the purpose  of  reinforcing the common working practices  of  the national
authorities and  providing the indispensable structures and mechanisms.
V. THE FIRST STAGE
The measures proposed for the first stage at once call for a substantial
effort on the part  of  the Member States and the Community. It is necessary
to guard against any excessive precipitateness, but the credibility and the
smooth progress  of  the undertaking demand that a specific period should be
fixed; the Group considers that a period  of  three years would be appropriate.
General arrangements
The reinforcement  of  the coordination  of  economic policies during the
first stage seems one  of  the principal measures to be taken. One  of  the
essential objectives to be attained will be to develop a rapid reciprocal
exchange  of  information and to make possible the determination in common
of  the fundamental guidelines  of  economic and monetary policy.
A certain number  of  requirements and limits must be set. The coordina-
tion  of  economic policies necessarily entails constraint, but this can only be
applied progressively. The arrangements to be adopted and the actions to be
undertaken must aim at efficiency, and take account  of  the final concept 
economic and monetary union. During the first stage the mechanisms and
institutions necessary will be established and will function on the basis  of  the
present provisions  of  the Treaty. However, the decisions taken must already
be recorded in the progress  of  evolution that must end in the structure envisaged
for the conclusion  of  the plan by stages.
Procedure
The coordination  of  the economic policies must be based on  at least
three annual surveys  in depth  of  the economic situation in the Community
that will make it possible to decide on guidelines in common.
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Nevertheless, the surveys will be made on fixed dates. At the outset, these
dates will be chosen in such a way as to ensure the best possible adaptation to
the deadlines now in force in the Member States for the establishment and
adoption of their budgets. Subsequently the deadlines will be synchronized
so . as to permit greater efficiency in the coordination of policies.
first survey  in the spring will provide an opportunity for drawing up
a balance sheet for economic policy in the previous year and possibly for adapting
that relating to the current year to the requirements of economic development.
At the same time a first exchange of views will take place to prepare for the
following meeting. In addition, the quantitative medium-term objectives will
be revised according to the procedure laid down for drawing up the medium-
term programmes of economic policy.
In order to arrive at the determination of quantitative guidelines for the
principal elements of the whole of the public budgets for the following year
and to enable governments to take note of the Community reactions before
they draw up their budget plans, ordinary and extraordinary, on a definitive
basis, a  second survey,  a little before the middle of the year will make an initial
selection of the guidelines for the policy to be implemented in the following
year and will review the policy to be followed dur-ing the current year. This
analysis will be effected within the framework of the economic accounts and
will make it possible to establish preliminary economic budgets.
Finally, a  survey carried out in the autumn  will make it possible to lay
down in greater detail the guidelines arrived at in the course of the year.
Economic budgets compatible with one another will then be drawn up. They
will contain as regards budget policy the same elements as at the previous survey
completed by additional data which would not have been available previously.
The guidelines gi Yen in the economic budgets will serve as a point of reference
for the authorities responsible for the determination of monetary and credit
policy. On the occasion of this survey the Council will draw up, on the proposal
of the Commission, an  annual report on the economic situation of the Commu-
nity indicating in particular the guidelines for economic policy at short term
in the following year.
These regular examinations will make it possible to proceed to a
permanent surveillance of the situation. However, as was foreseen also in
the decision of the Council of 
17 July 1969,  ad hoc  surveys may prove to be
necessary for recommending or deciding on specific measures; they will be
undertaken at the request of a Member State or of the Commission. In order
to facilitate the detection of dangerous .situations, a system of Community
indicators will be worked out.
The recommendations regarding the guidelines for the economic policy
to be followed will be addressed in a specific and detailed manner to each member
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providing that in the event of such recommendations having to be put to the
vote the country concerned would abstain.
The procedures for consultation will be reinforced by the abandonment
of any previous obligatory restriction as to their character. These consultations
will cover economic policy at medium term, short term economic policy,
budget policy and monetary policy; they should lead to the formulation 
national deci&ions in accordance with the points of view arrived at in common.
T 6 ensure the necessary effectiveness, rapidity .and discretion, special
procedures must be envisaged for the preparation of the work, its development
and the conclusions. The procedures now in force are not adapted to the require-
ments of the case. The Group is fully conscious of the very heavy labours
entailed in the proposed procedure. They demand great effort on the part of
all the participants and assume that in both the Member States and the
Community institutions the necessary conditions from the personal and
organizational point of view will be fulfilled.
Organs
The coordination of economic policies during the first stage will depend
on increased activity by the Community organs, in particular the Council a3d
the Commission as well as the Committee of Governors of the central banks.
During the first stage the Council will be the central organ of decision for
general economic policy. It will fix the objectives at medium term and within
this framework will work out annual programmes. More generally, it will
follow and direct economic policy throughout the year. In particular the
Council will translate the intentions of general policy while defining the broad
lines of budget policy"
The Council will be composed of the ministers responsible in .each Member
State for economic and financial matters, with the participation of the competent
members of the Commission; the Governors of the central banks should attend
the meetings. The meetings will be limited in number and will take place on
the date fixed for the regular surveys mentioned above.
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Council's labours  on the basis
of reports as up-to-date as possible and to guarantee a sufficient measure of
coordination it must be possible to assemble rapidly persons of high standing
representing Governments and central banks. These persons, who will thus
not be sitting as independent experts, will have sufficient powers to facilitate
the taking of decisions. Furthermore, they will be able to proceed to the
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17 July 1969 and of 16 February 1970.
Important responsibilities will have to be assumed by the Commission,
which will be entitled in particular within the framework of the powers laid down
in the Treaties to make any proposal to the Council in order that the latter may
rule on the matters in question. The Commission will make all necessary
contacts with the competent national administrations, either direct or through
Committees or groups of experts.
Greater activity will also be exercised by the different committees
responsible for the problems of economic policy.
Finally, the Committee of Governors of the central banks will play an
increasingly important role as regards problems of monetary policy both
internal and external. The frequency of the meetings and the competence
of the 'Committee will be adapted to ensure the preparation of the monetary
aspects of the meetings of the Council envisaged above, to bring about current
consultation and in particular to make it possible to define the general
guidelines of monetary and credit policy within the Community.
The Committee of Governors will be able to express opinions or make
recommendations to the central banks of the member countries when it wishes
to give a particular direction to the action of the latter. It will be able to make
recommendations to the Council and the Commission suggesting the Community
measures that seem to it to be called for.
The proposals outlined above will help to ensure the coordination of
economic policies, but it is advisable that at least once a year this should be
the subject of a more formal approach. For this purpose the "annual report
on the economic situation in the Community" brought out at the time of the
survey scheduled for the autumn will be presented to the European Parliament
and to the Economic and Social Committee, and the governments will bring it
to the notice of the national parliaments for the latter to take into account in
the debates on the budget proposals. An analogous procedure will be followed
for the quantitative objectives at medium term determined at Community
level.
Concertation" with the social partners
For the successful realization of economic and monetary union it is essential
to bring the social partners into the preparations for the Community economic
policy. It is therefore necessary that major guidelines on economic policy
should not be adopted until they have been consulted. For this purpose it
will be necessary to establish at the outset procedures for regular "concertation
at the Community level between the Commission and the social partners.
S. 11 - 1970Policies
Budget policy
Within the framework of the procedures already described special emphasis
must be placed on the efforts to be made with a view to the coordination and
harmonization of budget policies.
According to the economic situation in each country quantitative guide-
lines will be given on the principal elements of the public budgets, notably on
global receipts and expenditure, the distribution of the latter between invest-
ment and consumption, and the direction and amount of the balance. Finally,
special attention will be paid to the method of financing deficits or utilizing
surpluses.
To facilitate the harmonization of budget policies, searching comparisons
will be made of the budgets of the Member States from both quantitative and
qualitative points of view. From the quantitative point of view the comparison
will embrace the total of the public budgets, including local authorities and social
security. It will be necessary to evaluate the whole of the fiscal pressure and
the weight of public expenditure in the different countries of the Community
and the effects that public receipts and expenditure have on global internal
demand and on monetary stability. It will also be necessary to devise a method
of calculation enabling an assessment to be made of the impulses that the whole
of the public budgets impart to the economy.
From the practical point of view, it will be necessary to effect a harmoniza-
tion of timetables for the presentation and adoption of the budget proposals.
Finally, from the very outset, efforts will be made to introduce and develop
homologous instruments in each country; examples are, on the revenue side
the "fiscal regulators" and on the expenditure side, "cyclical budgets Fiscal
regulators authorize rapid adjustments in the rates of tax up to a limited amount
and for a limited period; cyclical budgets permit the addition or reduction 
final budget figures by a certain percentage of expenditure.
Fiscal policy
In order to permit the progressive and complete suppression of fiscal
frontiers in the Community, while respecting the elasticity that is necessary in
order that fiscal policy may have its effect at different levels, it will be necessary
to realize in the various fiscal fields the measures enumerated below.
As regards indirect taxes, the system of the value-added tax will be made
general and a programme for the alignment of rates adopted. Similarly, as
regards excise duties, a programme leading to a sufficient alignment of the
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across the frontiers.
The programmes  of  alignment will be carried out in a parallel manner
and the rate  of  implementation will be such that as from the end  of  the first
stage the controls on private individuals at intra-Community frontiers can be
suppressed.
In the field  of  direct taxes, it will be necessary to standardize certain types
of  tax which are likely to have a direct influence on the movement  of  capital
within the Community. In practice it is mainly a question  of  the harmoniza-
tion  of  the fiscal regime applied to interest payments on fixed interest securities
and dividends. It will also be necessary to initiate and actively promote the
harmonization  of  the structure  of  taxes on corporations.
The policy for financial markets
The freedom  of  movement  of  capital within the Common Market has
fallen short  of  the objectives fixed in the Treaty: in a certain number  of  countries
there still exist exchange restrictions on important transactions; and in addition
internal legislation and practices prevent the free circulation  of  capital within
the Community. Disparities in the cost  of  credit and the conditions  of  access
to credit resulting therefrom falsify competition and conflict with the institu-
tion  of  economic and monetary union.
To remedy this state  of  affairs, it seems necessary to take prompt action
in two directions: the abolition  of  obstacles to capital movements, in particular
residual exchange control regul~tions, and a coordination  of  policies as regards
financial markets. This double action seems necessary so that the opening 
markets can have its full effect and contribute to the-smooth operation 
of  the
Common Market.
As regards the abolition  of  obstacles, it will be necessary as a first step
to fix ceilings up to which issues  of  bonds by residents in other member countries
may be authorized without discrimination resulting from exchange control
regulations or administrative practices. These ceilings will be raised progres-
sively until all the markets have been opened completely. Similar actions will
be taken for the financing  of  investments by credit at medium and long term.
The introduction on the stock exchange  of  securities emanating from other
member countries will be freed from all discrimination. In addition, it will
be necessary to adapt the regulations governing institutional investors so as
to enable them to effect placings throughout the Community.
As regards the coordination  of  policies in relation to financial markets
a distinction must be made between current aspects and structural aspects.
For the current aspects the member countries will proceed to regular consulta-
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within and outside the Community by movements  of  capital; and they will
initiate the concertation  of  national policies in these domains. As regards the
structural aspect, it is necessary to carry out measures  of  technical" harmoniza~
tion in a series  of  fields, as for example regulations governing the activities 
credit institutions and institutional investors, the notification and protection
of  holders  of  securities, conditions for the operation  of  stock exchanges, the
encouragement  of  saving and certain forms of investment, and the legal instru-
ments  of  financial transactions.
Domestic monetary and credit policy
The general lines  of  monetary and credit policy will be defined on a
common basis. In this context it is necessary to introduce progressively a
measure  of  conformity between the instruments  of  monetary and credit policy
at the disposal  of  the member countries.
In order to ensure the coordination  of  domestic monetary and credit
policies, prior obligatory consultations will be held within the Committee 
Governors. These consultations will be effected in the following way: the
Committee  of  Governors will examine periodically, and at least twice a year
the situation and policies in each member country in the monetary field. At
the end  of  each scrutiny, and having regard to the conclusions arrived at by the
Council for economic policy, guidelines will be laid down concerning the conduct
of  monetary and credit policy, principally as regards the level  of  interest rates
the evolution  of  bank liquidity and the granting  of  credit to the private and public
sectors.
The measures to be taken should correspond to the guidelines formulated
by the Committee  of  Governors and should be the subject  of  mutual reports
prior to their application. If the competent authorities in one or several Member
States, or the Commission, consider that the measures to be put into force
are not in accordance with the guidelines given they may demand a consulta-
tion. In the event  of  dispositions departing from the guidelines given being
contemplated by a Member State, the latter must arrange a consultation before-
hand.
The harmonization  of  the instruments  of  monetary policy is one  of  the
necessary conditions for ensuring the complete effectiveness  of  coordination and
joint maintenance  of  the monetary policies. For this reason it will be necessary
to establish without delay a programme for action in this field. In addition
it is essential to press on with harmonization in order to ensure a better
adaptation  of  the structures and statutes  of  the credit institutions to the require-
ments  of  a unified market.
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The process for the realization of economic and monetary union demands
from the outset an intensification of cooperation in the matter of external
monetary policy.
It is desirable that the solidarity of the member countries in the
determination of their exchange parities should be supported by a reinforce-
ment of the consultation procedures in the matter. 
The reinforcement of concertation in the matter of monetary policy will
concern the utilization and the granting of credits, as for example drawings from
the International Monetary Fund and swap credits, the creation of new
liquidity in the form of an increase in the quotas or a further development
of Special Drawing Rights, as well as the foreign exchange position of the banks.
It will be necessary to take a first step towards the progressive institution of a
representative Unit for the EEC at the IMF and other international financial
undertakings.
In accordance with the decision of the Council of 8 and 9 June 1970
the Community must progressively adopt common positions in its monetary
relations with third countries and international organizations; in particular
it must not avail itself in foreign exchange relations between member countries
of any provisions allowing greater flexibility in the international foreign
exchange system.
As regards foreign exchange relations within the Community itself, the
Group advocates for the first stage a certain number of measures the realization
of which will be conditioned for each one by the result of the previous measure,
so as. to permit a constant adaptation of the process according to the circum-
stances:
From the start of the first stage, by way of experiment, the central banks
acting in concert will limit  de facto  the fluctuations in the rates of ~xchange
between their currencies to narrower margins than those resulting from
the application of the margins in force for the dollar at the time of the
adoption of the system. This objective will be achieved by concerted
action in relation to the dollar.
Mter this experimental period the limitation of the margins can be
officially announced.
The concerted action in relation to the dollar can be completed by
interventions in Community currencies, first at the limit of the margins
and later within them. These interventions should be so arranged,
however, that during the first stage the credit facilities to which they
might give rise do not go beyond those provided for in the mechanism
of monetary support at short term.
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between Community currencies can be decided upon.
The first of the measures referred to above should be taken at the
beginning of the first stage, when the Council will have adopted the plan for
the realization of economic and monetary union; for the subsequent steps the
Group thinks it better not to suggest a rigid timetable. For this reason it
proposes that the Committee of Governors should tWice a year make a report
to the Council and to the Commission on the development of the measures
being taken and on the advisability of adopting new measures. On this basis
and according to the progress realized towards the harmonization of economic
policies, the Council or the Member States assembled in the Council will take
the appropriate decisions. Nevertheless, this procedure will not be necessary
for reductions  de facto  in the intra-community margins resulting from the
concerted action of the central banks. 
In order to facilitate the development of the operations advocated it will
be advisable to entrust to an agent the, task of recording the balances of the
operations effected in the foreign exchange markets of the member countries
of the Community, to inform each central bank of them periodically and if
the need arises to suggest transfers or possible offsets in Community currencies
and in dollars.
It is necessary, finally, to undertake a study in depth of the conditions of
creation and operation, and of the statutes of the "European Fund for monetary
cooperation" outlined in chapter VI below and intended to ensure the necessary
transition towards the Community system for central banks contemplated for
the final phase.
The other fields
It is essential to pursue the measures undertaken in the various fields,
for example the suppression of the residual obstacles to intra-community
trade; an inventory of the aid and grants the standardization of which 
necessary, on the one hand to ensure the free play of competition, and on the
other hand to develop common industrial and regional policies; the formulation
of a transport policy; the application of a common commercial policy in
conformity with the Treaty; the implementation of a common policy in the
matter of insurance and credit for exports and aid to countries in course of
development; and the formulation and adoption of statutes for a European
company.
The statistical apparatus of the Member States is still far from being
satisfactory and presents gaps. To facilitate the coordination of economic
policies it is essential that the efforts already made in this field should be
renewed.
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In the course of this stage it will be necessary to complete the preparatory
work designed to adapt and complete the Treaty, in order to permit, a
sufficient interval before the end of the first stage and following the procedures
laid down in Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome, the convocation in good time
of an intergovernmental conference which will be apprised of the proposals
formulated in the matter. In this way procedures will be adopted making it
possible to establish the necessary legal bases for the transition to the
complete realization of economic and monetary union and the implementation
of the essential institutional reforms implied by the latter. 
....
In the light of a balance sheet making it possible to measure the progress
realized in all fields, the Council will then be in a position to establish a new
programme of action containing measures that could be undertaken on the basis
of the Treaty and others which would have to await its revision before they
could be realized.
VI. THE TRANSITION TOWARDS THE FINAL OBJECTIVE
In the course of this final phase, action will have to be taken on a
number of fronts. The action will entail, first further coordination of national
policies, then their harmonization by the adoption of directives or common
decisions, and finally the transfer of responsibility from the national authorities
to Community authorities. As progress is made Community instruments
will be created to carryon or complete the action of the national instruments.
The coordination of economic and monetary policies  will already have
advanced to a point at which its fundamental elements are in place; subsequently
it will have to be strengthened by ever closer regard for the common interest.
This will first have to be done in relation to  short-term economic policy.
To do this it will be necessary to isolate the conflicts and the lines of
convergence in national policies. It will then be essential to define strategies
aiming at the realization of a Community optimum which will not necessarily
be a simple juxtaposition of national optimums. At the same time it will be
necessary progressively to make the definition and general guidelines of economic
policy more binding and ensure a sufficient degree of harmonization in monetary
and budget policies.
The programmes of  economic policy at medium term  will have to be more
and more closely geared to Community objectives, the realization of which
will be ensured by policies conducted on the one hand at the national level and
on the other hand at the Community level, the emphasis shifting gradually from
the former to the latter.
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volume, and for the direction and size  of  the balances on the public budgets, will
be made increasingly restrictive. The homologous instruments  of  budget policy
developed during the first stage will be applied progressively on a common basis.
The suppression  of  the obstacles  of  various kinds and the harmonization
of  the financial structures should make it possible to arrive at a true  common
capital market  by the progressive interpenetration  of  the national markets.
In the framework  of  an economic and monetary union it is not enough
to pay attention to policies  of  global economic equilibrium alone. It will
also be necessary to envisage measures bearing on  structural problems  the
essence  of  which will be profoundly modified by the realization  of  this process.
In this context the Community measures should primarily concern regional
policy and employment policy. Their realization would he facilitated by an
increase in financial intervention effected at Community level. In addition,
it will be necessary to arrive progressively at Community guidance for policies
on industry, transport, power, housing, and the environment.
The reinforcement  of  intra-community links in the  monetary field  must
be so formulated as to facilitate the transition to economic and monetary
union, in which equilibrium between the economies  of  the Member States will
be ensured by the free circulation  of  the factors  of  production and by financial
transfers in the public and private sectors.
Progress in the convergence of economic and monetary policies should
be such in the course  of  the second stage that the' Member States no longer
have to resort on an autonomous basis to the instrument  of  parity adjustment.
In any case, it will be necessary further to reinforce the consultation procedures
laid down for the first stage. Only at the moment  of  transition to the final
stage will autonomous parity adjustments be totally excluded.
In order to prepare the final stage in good time, it will be necessary to set
up as soon as possible a "European Fund for monetary cooperation" under
the control  of  the Governors  of  the central banks. To the extent that the
techniques  of  intervention in the foreign exchange markets laid down for the
first stage and described on pages 22 and 23 have functioned normally and
without friction and that sufficient harmonization has been achieved in economic
policies it may well be possible to establish the fund in the course  of  the
first stage. In any event it will have to be established during the second stage.
This fund will have to absorb the mechanisms for monetary support at short
term and for financial aid at medium term. As progress is achieved towards
economic and monetary, union the fund will gradually become an organ 
management  of  the reserves at the Community level and be integrated at the
final stage in the Community system  of  central banks which will then be set
up. Furthermore, it will be necessary to bring about the harmonization 
the instruments  of  monetary policy in order to facilitate the reinforcement 
Community policy in this field.
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The Group, recalling that the Council adopted on 8 .and 9 June 1970
the conclusions presented by the Group in its interim report, suggests to the
Council that it should accept the contents of the present report and approve
the following conclusions:
A. Economic and monetary union is an objective realizable in the course of
the present decade provided only that the political will of the Member States to
realize this objective, as solemnly declared at .the Conference at The Hague
is present. The union will make it possible to e~sure growth and stability
within the Community and reinforce the contribution it can make to economic
and monetary equilibrium in the world and make it a pillar of stability.
B. Economic and monetary union means that the principal decisions of
economic policy will be taken at Community level and therefore that the
necessary powers will be transferred from the national plane to the Community
plane. These transfers of responsibility and the creation of the corresponding
Community institutions represent a process of fundamental political significance
which entails the progressive development of political cooperation. The
economic and monetary union thus appears as a leaven for the development
of political union which in the long run it will be unable to do
without.
C. A monetary union implies, internally, the total and irreversible convert-
ibility of currencies, the elimination of margins of fluctuation in rates of
exhange, the irrevocable fixing of parity ratios and the total liberation of
movements of capital. It may be accompanied by the maintenance of national
monetary symbols, but considerations of a psychological and political order
militate in favour of the adoption of a single currency which would guarantee
the irreversibility of the undertaking.
D. On the institutional plane, in the final stage, two Community organs are
indispensable: a centre of decision for economic policy and a Community
system for the central banks. These institutions, while safeguarding their own
responsibilities, must be furnished with effective powers of decision and must
work together for the realization of the same objectives. The centre of economic
decision will be politically responsible to a European Parliament.
E. Throughout the process, as progress is achieved Community instruments
will be created to carry out or complete the action of the national
instruments. In all fields the steps to be taken will be interdependent and
will reinforce one another; in particular the development of monetary
unification will have to be combined with parallel progress towards the
harmonization and finally the unification of economic policies.
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whole  of  the plan by stages does not seem feasible. It is necessary in fact
to maintain a measure  of  flexibility to permit any adaptations that the
experience acquired during the first stage may suggest. Particular emphasis
should therefore be placed on the first stage, for which a package  of  concrete
measures is presented. The decisions on the details  of  the- final stages and the
future timetable will have to be taken at the end  of  the first stage.
G. The first stage will commence on 1 January 1971 and will cover a
period  of  three years. In addition to the action approved by the Council in
its decision  of  8 and 9 June 1970 it will entail the adoption  of  the following
measures:
1. The consultation procedures will have a preliminary and obligatory
character and will call for increased activity by the Community organs, in
particular the Council and the Commission, as well as the Committee 
Governors  of  the central banks. These consultations will principally concern
economic policy at medium term, short-term economic policy, budget policy
and monetary policy.
2. The Council will meet at least three times a year to lay down, on the
proposal  of  the Commission, the broad lines  of  economic policy at Community
level and quantitative guidelines for the principal elements  of  the whole  of  the
public budgets. ,Once a year, in the autumn, the economic policy in the
Community will be the subject  of  recommendations contained in an annual
report on the economic situation  of  the Community which will be transmitted
to the European Parliament and to the Economic and Social Committee and
which the Governments will bring to the notice  of  the national parliaments.
3 . In order to promote efficiency in the Council'.s labours and to ensure
sufficient coordination, the Council must be in a position to assemble rapidly
persons  of  high standing representing Governments and central banks, who
will be able to hold prior consultations.
4. Before the adoption  of  the broad lines  of  economic policy at the
Community level, consultations will take place between the Commission and
the social partners in accordance with procedures to be laid down.
5. The budget policy  of  the Member States will be conducted in accordance
with Community objectives. For this purpose, within the framework  of  the
meetings  of  the Council referred to in paragraph 2 above, a Community
survey will be effected before the Governments draw up their budget proposals
on a definitive basis. The national budget procedures will be synchronized.
In the fiscal field, countries will adopt the harmonization advocated in the
present report and the integration  of  financial markets will be intensified.
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in the coordination of monetary and credit policy; in particular it will lay
down in this field the general guidelines for the Community. It will be able
to express opinions and make recommendations to the central banks . of the
member coul1tries. and express opinions to the Council and the Commission.
7. To reinforce solidarity within the Community in the matter of fO1eign
exchange, the central banks are invited, from the beginning of the first stage,
to restrict on an experimental basis the fluctuations of rates between
Community currencies within narrower bands than those resulting from the
application of the margins in force in relation to the dollar. This objective
would be achieved by concerted action in relation to the dollar. According to
circumstances and to the results achieved in the standardization of economic
policies new measures may be taken. These will consist of a transition from
de facto  regime to a  de jure  regime of intervention in Community currencies
and the progressive narrowing of the margins of fluctuation between
Community currencies.
8 . The actions foreseen in the foreign exchange field will be facilitated by
the intervention of an agent charged with the tasks of statistical registration
information, and advice.
9. The rapid harmonization of the instruments of monetary policy is
necessary. For this reason it will be necessary as soon as possible to
undertake the preparatory work in this field.
10. The modifications to be made in the Treaty of Rome in order to make
possible the final realization of economic and monetary union must be prepared
in good time during the first stage.
11. In accordance with Article 236 of the Treaty .of Rome, an inter-
governmental conference will be called in good time before the end of the
first stage with a view to drawing up the necessary modifications for the
complete realization of economic and monetary union. A special meeting
of the Council will be called to draw up a balance sheet of progress achieved
in the first stage and lay down a programme for specific action in the years
to come.
H. The  second stage  will be characterized by the promotion on a number
of fronts and on ever more restrictive lines of the action undertaken during
the first stage: the laying down of global economic guidelines, the coordination
of short-term economic policies by monetary and credit measures, and budget
and fiscal measures, the adoption of Community policies in the matter of
structures, the integration of financial markets and the progressive elimination
of exchange rate fluctuations between Community currencies.
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must be effected as soon as possible by the establishment  of  a European Fund
for monetary cooperation as a forerunner  of  the Community system 
central banks for the final stage. In accordance with the experience acquired
in the matter  of  the reduction  of  margins and the convergence  of  economic
policies it may well be possible to establish the Fund during the first stage and
in any event in the course  of  the second stage. The preparatory work for this
purpose must be put in hand as soon as possible.
ole .;.
The Group expresses the wish that the Council should approve the
suggestions contained in the present report and should make, on the proposal
of  the Commission, all the arrangements needed for the realization  of  the plan
by stages, and in particular before the end  of  the year any that may be
necessary to put the first stage into operation on 1 January 1971.
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INTEGRAL TEXT OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE
OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE HEADS OF STATE
OR GOVERNMENT
ON 1 AND 2 DECEMBER 1969 AT THE HAGUE
1. On the initiative of the Government of the French Republic and at the
invitation of the Government of the Netherlands, the Heads of State or
Government and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the
European Communities met at The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969.
On the second day, the Commission of the European Communities was
invited to participate in the proceedings of the Conference.
2. Now that the final phase of the Common Market is about to begin they
considered that it was the duty of those in each of the member countries of
their Community who bear the heaviest political responsibilities to draw up
balance sheet of the work that has been achieved, to manifest their
determination to carry it on, and to lay down broad guidelines for the future.
3. Assessing the ground covered, and observing that perhaps never before
have independent States carried cooperation further, they were unanimous in
the opinion that in view of the progress realized the Community has today
reached a turning point in its history. Apart from the technical or legal aspects
of the problems that it poses, the .development scheduled for the end of the year
is of major political significance. Entering into the final phase of the Common
Market is not only in fact putting the seal on the irreversible character of the
work accomplished by the Communities, it is also preparing the way for a
united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of
tomorrow and. of making a contribution corresponding to its tradition and its
mISSIOn.
4. Consequently, the Heads of State or Government desire to reaffirm their
faith in the political objects which give to the Community its whole meaning
and significance, their determination to carry the enterprise through to its
conclusion, and their confidence in the final success of their efforts. They hold
in common the conviction that a Europe consisting of States which in their
national diversity are united in their essential interests, assured of its own
cohesion, faithful to its external friendships, conscious of the part it plays in
facilitating the relaxation of international tensions and rapprochement between
all peoples, and first and foremost between the peoples of the European continent
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development, progress and culture, to the equilibrium of the world and to the
protection of peace.
The European Communities are the original nucleus from which European
unity has developed and taken wing. The adhesion to these Communities of
other countries in the continent  in accordance with the provisions of the
Treaties of Rome  would undoubtedly contribute to the development of the
Communities to dimensions approximating to an increasing extent to the
present state of the economy and technology. The establishment of special
links with other European countries who have expressed the desire for it
should also play its part. Such a development would enable Europe to
remain faithful to its traditions of opening up to the world and augmenting
its efforts in favour of the countries in course of development.
5. As regards the culminating stage of the Communities the Heads of State
or Government have reaffirmed the will of their Governments to pass from
the period of transition to the definitive stage of the European Community and
consequently to adopt the agricultural financial regulations at the end of 1969.
Within the framework of these financial regulations and taking account
of all the interests involved, they agree to the progressive replacement of the
contributions of the member countries by own resources with a view to
arriving in the long run at the integral financing of the budgets of the
Communities in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 201 of the
Treaty setting up 'the EEC and to reinforcing the budget powers of the European Parliament. 
The problem of the method of direct elections will continue to be
examined by the Council of Ministers.
6. They have asked the Governments to pursue without delay within the
Council the efforts already undertaken to ensure a better control of the market
a policy of agricultural production making it possible to reduce budget
charges.
7. The acceptance of a financial arrangement for the final period does not
preclude its adaptation on a unanimous basis for the purpose in particular of
enlarging the Community on condition that the principles of the arrangement
are not altered.
8. They have reaffirmed their wish to carry on more rapidly with the
further development necessary to reinforce the Community and its development
into an economic union. They are of the opinion that the process of integration
should end in a Community of stability and growth. With this object in
view they have agreed that on the basis of the memorandulll presented by the
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Commission a plan by stages should be drawn up by the Council during
1970 with a view to the creation of an economic and monetary union.
The development of monetary cooperation should be based on the
harmonization of economic policies.
They have agreed thai: the possibility should be examined of setting up
a European reserve fund, to which a common economic:: and monetary policy
would lead.
9. As regards the technological activity of the Community, they have
reaffirmed their wish to follow more closely the activity of the Community
with a view to coordinating and encouraging industrial research and
development in the key sectors, notably by Community programmes, and to
furnishing the .financial resources for the purpose.
10. They agree also on the necessity of making further efforts to formulate
shortly for the European Atomic Energy Community a programme of research
worked out according to the requirements of modern industrial management
and calculated to ensure the most efficacious utilization of the Joint Research
Centre.
11. They have reaffirmed their interest in the establishment of a European
University.
12. The Heads of State or Government recognize the need for the reform
of the Social Fund within the framework of a close concertation of social policies.
13. They have reaffirmed their agreement on the principle of enlargement of
the Community as laid down in Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.
In so far as States applying for membership accept the Treaties and their
political objective, the decisions that have been taken since the entry into force
of the Treaties and the options taken in the field of development, the Heads
of State or Government have signified their agreement to the opening of
negotiations between the Community on the one hand and applicant States
on the other hand.
They have agreed that the preparatory work essential to the establishment
of a basis of common negotiations may be undertaken at the most suitable and
earliest opportunities; and these preparations will be accomplished by common
consent in the most positive spirit.
14. As soon as negotiations with applicant countries have been opened,
discussions will be started with the other member countries of EFT A who so
request on their position in relation to the EEC.
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way of realizing progress in the field of political unification with a view to
enlargement. The Ministers will make proposals on this subject before the end
of July 1970.
16. All the creative measures and measures for European growth here decided
on will be assured of a greater future if youth is closely associated with them;
this preoccupation has been borne in mind by the Government, and the
Communities will proceed accordingly.
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DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF 6 MARCH 1970
REGARDING THE PROCEDURE IN THE MATTER OF
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY COOPERATION
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
with the object of giving effect at the first possible moment to the
resolution on economic and monetary union in the Community passed
by the Conference of Heads of State or Government held at The Hague
on 1 and 2 December 1969 (paragraph 8 of the Communique),
taking note of the suggestions. formulated by the Governments and of
the Communication from the Commission to the Council regarding the
formulation of a plan by stages with a view to the creation of economic
and monetary union
DECIDES:
to invite the Chairmen of the Monetary Committee, of the Committee of
Governors of the central banks, of the Medium-term Economic Policy Com-
mittee, of the Short-term Economy Policy Committee, and of the Budget Policy
Committee, together with a representative of the Commission to meet under
the chairmanship of Mr Pierre Werner to prepare a report containing an analysis
of the different suggestions and making it possible to identify the basic issues
for a realization by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community.
A first report will be presented to the Council and the Commission
before the end of the month of May 1970, so that the Council can consider it.
Done in Brussels, 6 March 1970
For the Council
The President
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EXTRACT FROM THE ABSTRACT OF DECISIONS
116th SESSION OF THE COUNCIL
8 AND 9 JUNE 1970
Statement by the Chairman, Mr Werner,
on the proceedings regarding the plan by stages
and the action to be taken on the interim report
The Council has endorsed the joint conclusions based on the
proceedings of the Group presided over by Mr Werner, namely:
the starting point of the process to be embarked upon is to be found
in the completion of the measures advocated in the memorandum from
the Commission to the Council of 12 February 1969. That implies
that the Council will decide between now and the end ' of 1970 on
the quantitative guidelines at medium term and the institution of
financial aid at medium term;
the final objective determined by the Conference of Heads of State or
Government has emerged as an objective that may be reached in the
course of the present decade, provided it enjoys the permanent political
support of the Governments;
economic and monetary union signifies that the principal decisions of
economic policy will be taken at Community level and therefore that
the necessary powers will be transferred from the national plane to
the Community plane. Its final result could be the adoption of a sole
currency that will guarantee the irr:eversibility of the undertaking;
between the starting point and the achievement of the final objective
numerous measures will have to be taken on a parallel and progressive
basis on a number of fronts. Certain measures imply a modification
of the Treaty of Rome the preparatory work for which must be
brought to a successful conclusion during the first stage. Nevertheless,
the present arrangements already allow substantial advances to be made;
the first stage should commence on 1 January 1971 and be completed
in a specified period; on the technical plane, a delay of three years
seems appropriate. This stage will be intended to render the Community
instruments increasingly operational and to confer individuality on the
Community within the international monetary system;
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be dissociated from the entire process of economic and monetary
integration. It must therefore be embarked on in the determination to
arrive at the final objective;
this first stage should include a reinforcement of the procedures for
consultation according to methods which still remain to be determined;
the budget policy of the Member States must be conducted in accordance
with Community objectives; a certain harmonization should occur in the
fiscal field; currency and credit policy must be strongly coordinated and
the integration of financial markets must be intensified;
the Community must progressively adopt common positions in monetary
relations with third countries and international organizations; in
particular it should not avail itself in the foreign exchange relations
between member countries of any provision that would permit a
weakening of the international foreign exchange system.
The Council has also invited t!:ie Group presided over by Mr Werner
to continue its work in the light of the guidelines developed from the exchange
of views that took place at the session of 8 and 9 June 1970 and paying
due regard to any opinions of the Committee of Governors of the central
banks that might be obtained on specific monetary problems. The Group
is invited to present its final report in the month of September next.
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CO MMITTEE OF GOVERNORS OF THE CENTRAL BANKS
OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
The Chairman
Basle, 13 September 1970
Urgent and Confidential
Mr P. Werner
Prime Minister of the Government
and Minister of Finance
Luxembourg
Sir,
In your letter of 12 June 1970, you invited the Committee of Governors
of the central banks of the Member States of the European Economic Commu-
nity to give its opinion on certain technical and economic aspects of the proposals
concerning progress in monetary matters contained in the interim report
presented by the Group over which you preside.
The Committee of Governors has instructed a committee of experts to
study the questions that you raised in your above-mentioned letter and which
were then set out in a questionnaire drawn up by your Group at its
meeting of 24 June 1970.
The Committee of experts whose work I have had the pleasure to
direct has prepared a circumstantial report dated 1 August 1970 which I have
the honour to send you herewith.
The Committee of Governors has examined this report; it considers
that it answers the questions contained in your letter and in the questionnaire
referred to above. It has adopted the conclusions arrived at, and 
particular it considers that the inauguration of a foreign exchange regime peculiar
to the Community might take as its starting point a concerted measure by the
central banks calculated to restrict " in fact fluctuations between their
currencies within narrower margins than those resulting from the application
of the margins in force for the dollar at the time the system is brought into
effect.
Your obedient servant
(a) H. Ansiaux
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Committee of Experts .presided over by Baron Ansiaux
1 August 1970
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PageI. Introduction
In accordance with the invitation of the Council of the European
Communities the group presided oyer by Mr Pierre Werner, the Prime
Minister and Minister of Finance of the Luxembourg Government, has asked
the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of
the European Economic Community for its opinion on certain specific
monetary problems. This request has been the subject of a letter! dated
12 June 1970 from Mr Werner to Baron Ansiaux, the chairman of the
Committee of Governors; the letter was subsequently dealt with in detail 
a questionnaire~ examined by the aforesaid group on the occasion of its
meeting on 24 June 1970.
These two documents taken together contain the whole of the questions
submitted for the opinion of the Committee of Governors on which the
experts based their labours.
The Committee of Experts3 took note of the fact that Question C in the
above-mentioned letter, which concerns the actual tightening up of monetary
policies and the harmonization of the instruments by means of which these
are now controlled, should not be examined in detail having regard
particularly to the delays entailed in the presentation of the opinion of the
Governors. It nevertheless recognizes the fundamental importance of this
question and suggests that the study of it should be undertaken as rapidly as
possible.
The experts have examined the technical aspects of the problems with a
view to preparing the answers that the Committee of Governors will have to
give to the questions put to them. They have not sought to pronounce on the
political expediency of the different courses that they have envisaged.
This technical examination has dealt essentially with the basic conditions
the methods, the consequences and the institutional procedures which
according to the terms of Mr Werner s letter, could ensue from the
establishment of a specific system of foreign exchange for the currencies of
the Member States.
II.  Condition,s to establish  specific system, of foreign exchange
The specific requirements of the system pf foreign exchange of the
Community may be investigated in three principal directions, which 
decreasing order of integration of the currencies are as follows:
(i) the establishment of a single Community currency;
Cf. Annex 1.
Cf. Annex 2.
Cf. Annex 3.
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rates;
(iii) differentiation between the margins of fluctuation allowed between
Community currencies and the margins applied to the currencies of
third countries.
The experts consider that it would be premature to adopt formulae (i)
and (ii) for the first step in the realization of economic and monetary union in
the Community; and that they would be more appropriate to a later stage
or even the final objective. They are unanimous in their view that in the
course of the first phase the possibility represented by formula (iii) is the
only one that should be envisaged.
The member countries of the Community having decided not to widen
the margins of fluctuation in force between their currencies, the differentiation
aimed at here can only tak(the form of a reduction or a suppression of the
inter-community margins, or perhaps, in the event ofa widening of the margins
applicable to third currencies, of the maintenance, or the reduction, or the
suppression of the inter-community margins.
III. Defini/Jions
The "Community level" of the dollar will result from the common
difference (fixed as a percentage positive or negative) allowed in relation to
its parity as expressed in each of the Community currencies.
The rate for the dollar in each of the markets of the Community may
deviate from this "Community level" by a percentage equal to half the
amount of the)luctuations allowed for the Community currencies.
The range between the upper margin and the lower margin will be
referred to hereafter as the "band"; it will fluctuate between the absolute
limits applicable to the dollar according to the development in course of time
of the "Community level"
These definitions are" illustrated by the graphs shown below,
Concertation" will have the object of fixing the "Community level" of
the dollar whenever it may be necessary.
::.
The inter-community margins are at present different from the margins applied to the inter-
vention currency, since these are established at about 0.75% each side of parity and the former
r at twice the margin applied to the intervention currency, or about 1.5% each side of parity.
i By "differentiation" is understood here the application to the intervention currency, that is
lto say the dollar, of an instantaneous margin of fluctuation narrower than the theoretical
margin :!: 0.75% and at the most equal to half the agreed inter-community margin.
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the margins of fluctuation applicable to the rate for the dollar remain
fixed at 0.75% each side of parity.
the margins of fluctuation .applicable to the reciprocal rates for the
Community currencies are reduced from 1.5% to 1.2% each side of
parity between Community currencies.
+ 0.75 
---
Situation according to the hypothesis Actual situation
----- -------------- - ----
$ parity
.....
/1.
75 
--- ----- ------------ ------
at a moment at a moment at a moment m m' m
A = Upper limit for dollar rate in the market in country A (currency A is weak).
Lower limit for dollar rate in the market in country B (currency B is strong).
The dotted line (. . . . ) represents the "Community level" for the dollar.
Consequences
The rate for currency A stands 1.5% below the parity expressed in
currency B.
Situation on the basis of the hypothesis
Movement over a period
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The fluctuations  of  the dollar rate in the EEC markets are maintained
within a " band"  of  1.2% maximlJm, limited in the above graph by the
external continuous lines; this "band" extends to 0.6% each side  of  a basic
dollar level chosen in common (the "Community level"
The same type  of  graph would illustrate the other hypothesis 
differentiation  of  the inter-community margins, that is to say  of  the
maintenance or reduction  of  these margins, accompanied by a widening  of  the
margin applicable to the dollar.
IV.  Pro  gressive reduction  or  outright suppression of
the inter-community margins
(1) The experts  of  one central bank are of the opinion that the outright
suppression  of  the inter-community margins, once the harmonization  of  the
economic policies  of  the Member States has made sufficient progress, would
have important advantages over a gradual elimination beginning at the first
stage. In fact, in so far as the trends of balances of payments can still
diverge the Member States have confliciting interests as regards the "Community
level"  of  the dollar. These conflicting interests could lead to a situation 
which it would not be possible to reach agreement on the intervention policy
to be followed; under these conditions the experiment would come to an end.
Even if a reduction in the margins were realized by means of informal
concertation, it could not be done without the knowledge  of  the foreign exchange
markets and a possible set-back to the experiment might then compromise the
credibility  of  the policy  of  intervention and even confidence in the parity.
On the other hand if agreement were reached in a situation  of  widely
divergent balance  of  payments trends, the intervention rate agreed on might
oblige one or several of the members to intervene against the natural trend
of  the market, which would be contrary to a sound logical policy. From the
point  of  view  of  the monetary policy  of  the member countries, the narrowing
of  the margins would reduce their autonomy, and such a reduction is
undesirable as long as autonomy on the economic and budgetary plane
remains intact. Therefore the experts in question are  of  the opinion that .any
possible advantages  of  narrowing the margins from the outset are rather  of 
political .and psychological nature and that these advantages raise certain doubts.
They are not in particular convinced that a reduced autonomy on the
monetary plane would necessarily lead to a greater degree  of'  coordination 
economic and budgetary policies in general, and they point out that a
similar consequence was expected from the common agricultural market, it
being hoped that this would eliminate adjustments in the parities 
Community currencies. Certainly the narrowing  of  the margins would
necessitate a reinforcement  of  cooperation between the central banks  of  the
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phase when the Community is furnished with a single currency, the external
value of which will be maintained by centralized intervention.
(2) The majority of the experts consider on the other hand that on the
hypothesis of a reduction in the margins of fluctu~tion between Community
currencies, to narrow them progressively would be preferable to suppressing
them without a transitional phase.
Certainly, on the purely technical plane the suppression of the margins
without a transitional phase would present the advantage of requiring the
central banks and the other participants in the foreign exchange markets to
effect the necessary adjustments once and for all.
However, the immediate suppression of the margins would entail too
severe a reduction in the autonomy of control of the Member States not only
in their foreign exchange relations to one another but also in their foreign
exchange relations with the outside world, which would then partake of .
Community nature. It would raise the supposition that the necessary con-
ditions existed on the economic and monetary plane to ensure the harmo-
nization of economic policies and sufficient uniformity in rates . of interest;
it would also raise the supposition that unity had been achieved on the
institutional plane in the management of the foreign exchange markets of
the Community and in particular that a Community authority had been
developed that was entitled to fix the level of the dollar.
For these reasons the suppression of the margins can only be contemplated
at an advanced stage of the process of economic and monetary unification.
In the course of the development of this process, progress in the
harmonization of economic policies would get the forces of the market
moving in the direction of a progressive limitation of fluctuations in rates
between Community currencies.
However that may be, to prepare the way from the outset, in
accordance with the terms of the letter from Mr Werner, for a specific
system of foreign exchange peculiar to the currencies of the Member States,
it will only be possible to proceed by a progressive reduction in the inter-
community margins or by widening the margins applied to the intervention
currency, the inter-community margins being first of all maintained at their
present level and then progressively reduced.
V. Methods of applicatio'll of differentiation of margins
If account is taken of the fact that a reduction in the fluctuations in the
rates between Community currencies can be effected either on an experimental
basis and without a definitive undertaking, or in a more formal manner, three
S. 11 - 1970types of action can be envisaged for the introduction of a differentiation between
the margins applicable to Community currencies and the margins applicable
to third currencies.
1) Concerted action by the central banks of the Community in their
foreign exchange markets with a view to  limiting in fact the fluctuations in
rates between their currencies.
On this hypothesis the inter-community margins would not be narrowed
officially but the mechanisms necessary for the purpose would be established
and brought into operation on an experimental basis.
2)  Official narrowing of the inter-community margins  to be determined in
the light of circumstances.
In this case it would be for the Member States to work to a declared
policy, the application of which would depend on the experience acquired
under 1 above.
3)  Maintenance of the present inter-community margins and widening
of the margins applicable to the dollar.
This line of conduct could be adopted if, having regard to the situation
and the policy in the United States, it seemed opportune to the six member
countries of the EEC to widen the margins applied to the dollar either
within the limits at present allowed or outside them if such a measure
were to be authorized by the International Monetary Fund.
If a step in this direction were taken at the beginning of the process of
economic and monetary unification it would render unnecessary the action
described in 1 and could precede or accompany the phase described in 2.
Several advantages, at least in theory, attach to this latter type of
action. In fact, the maintenance of the inter-community margins at their
present level leaves intact the liberty of manreuvre of the monetary authorities
of the member countries in their relations with the other members as regards
the respective rates of exchange between the currencies of the Community, the
level of interest rates and more generally the conduct of monetary policy.
Certain experts draw attention to the fact that the formula described
in 3 might give the impression that the Community has chosen to adopt a
policy of widening the margins of fluctuation. This formula, on the other
hand, although it affirms the monetary individuality of the Community, would
not at once lead the way to the suppression of inter-community margins
which forms the final objective.
The respective consequences of the various formulae for the differentiation
of inter-community margins in relation to the margins applicable to third
currencies are examined in greater detail in Chapter VII below.
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Whichever type of action is adopted to obtain the desired differentiation
the same methods of intervention in the foreign exchange markets can be
envisaged to obtain the desired result. The methods of intervention that help
to limit the fluctuations in rates between Community currencies to a level
that is independent of the margins applicable to the dollar fall into two
categories:
Interventions in dollars exclusively, at "concerted" rates.
Combined interventions in dollars and in Community currencies.
(1) The fluctuations in rates between Community currencies may be limited
to determined margins on condition that, by "concertation , the quotations
for the dollar at a given moment are established in different markets in the
Community in such a way that they are compatible with the margins adopted
by the EEC countries for fluctuations between their currencies. The methods
of achieving the necessary "concertation are set out in Chapter VIII
below.
The monetary authorities of each of the member countries would retain
. full liberty of manreuvre to intervene in dollars at rates within this band.
Such interventions would become obligatory as soon as the quotations for the
dollar reached the limits , of the band, unless by "concertation" it was decided
to shift this.
The possibility cannot be dismissed that in two or more markets in the
Community the rate for the dollar might settle down at opposite limits of the
band, and the reciprocal rate for the Community currencies concerned would
thus reach the limit imposed by the inter-community margin. In these
circumstances one central bank or even several might be obliged to intervene
more rapidly at different rates from those that they would have adopted if they
had been able to make full use of the whole of the margin applicable to the
dollar. Any realignment of the band in one direction or the other would only
alleviate the problems encountered by some central banks to the detriment of
the central banks quoting the dollar at the other limit of the band. "Concerta-
tion (cf. Chapter VIII) will then have to be resorted to to resolve such
divergences of interest.
At a particular stage in the process of monetary integration "concertation
on interventions in dollars might be used as an instrument in the monetary
policy of the Community vis-a.-vis the outside world: in fact, it might be
decided according to circumstances to vary upwards or downwards, over the
whole margin applicable to the dollar, the rates for the dollar quoted in all the
markets of the Community.
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effected either at the limits  of  fluctuation  of  these currencies, limits determined
by the new inter-community margins agreed, or within such limits. The
technical problems are different in the two cases.
(i) In the first case the intervention is easier to realize than in the second,
for the rates  of  intervention  of  EEC currencies will be known and fixed
once and for all for any given inter-community margin; these rates might
even be declared. The obligation to intervene at the limit points  of  the
Community currencies would make such intervention automatic. It
would, however, be fairly rare in view  of  the fact that the Community
currencies ought not normally to he at a level corresponding to their
maximum limits. As and when the Member States decide to reduce the
maximum spread intervention in Community currencies at their limit
would become more frequent.
Intervention in Community currencies within the limits  of  fluctuation
for these currencies presupposes that the central banks maintain a per-
manent cooperation between themselves to ensure harmony in their
intervention rates for Community currencies on the one hand and for
dollars on the other. This harmony between the rates could be obtained
by automatic application  of  cross rates. For that purpose it is essential
that the central banks are informed at aU times  of  the dollar rates quoted
in all the markets  of  the Community and, of course, that the problem 
concertation" on the " Community level"  of  the dollar is settled. More-
over, intervention would only be effected with the agreement  of  the central
banks whose currencies are being utilized.
In all cases, and as has already been said as regards intervention arranged
in dollars, the central banks would retain their freedom to adjust the rate
for the dollar inside the Community band.
(ii)
(iii)
By reason  of  its novelty and the adaptations it would necessitate, inter-
vention in Community currencies could be introduced and developed on a
gradual basis.
In the  first phase  the differentiation in the inter-community margins
would be realized by means  of  concerted intervention in dollars exclusively.
second phase  would entail, apart from concerted intervention in dollars
intervention in Community currencies at the limits  of  fluctuation  of  such curren-
CIes.
Certain experts consider that a .combination  of  the two first phases is
technically possible. They  see  in it the advantage that the Member States
would in this way affirm their intention to intervene at the limits  of  fluctuation
of  their currencies and would thus be able to loosen dependence on the usual
intervention currency, that is to say the dollar.
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it would be better to acquire experience and establish the proper functioning
of  ihtervention in dollars as provided for in the first phase before undertaking
intervention in Community currencies at the limits  of  the margins. It appears
to them in fact that concerted intervention against the dollar is at least .
effective as other methods  of  intervention and that it can lead equally well 
the individualization  of  the currencies  of  the Community by a progressive
elimination  of  the margins  of  fluctuation between these currencies.
It is possible that in a  third phase  intervention in Community currencies
could take place within the limits  of  fluctuation  of  these currencies, at rates
determined by the cross rates, and on the lines which have been described
above. Some experts consider that for the purpose  of  attaining the end in view
it would not even be necessary to adopt such a method, with the technical
complications that they see in it.
Whatever the more or less rapid course chosen for intervention in
Community currencies the central banks could seize every opportunity that
presented itself for effecting it, step by step or on an experimental basis.
The foreign exchange markets would in this way become accustomed progres-
sively to intervention in Community currencies.
VII. Consequences of differentiation i1Z inter-Community margins
The differentiation  of  inter-Community margins could have repercussions
on the reserves, the relations between rates  of  interest and the interest-rate
policy  of  Member States , forward rates  of  exchange and the application 
agricultural policy. As has already been indicated in Chapter V  of  the present
document these repercussions may vary, according to the formula adopted.
Reserves
(i) Reserve requirements
A differentiation realized by a  formal reduction 
or  a de facto reduction
in the inter- Community margins  could lead the central banks to intervene more
frequently in their foreign exchange markets by reason  of  the fact that with
more limited possibilities  of  fluctuation for the Community currencies interven-
tion could take place earlier than before. Nothing proves on the other hand
that this shift in the time and the point  of  intervention would have a marked net
effect as regards either gains or losses on the volume  of  the reserves  of  the
central banks. In fact, the foreign exchange markets would to a large extent
continue to ensure the necessary compensation. Furthermore, the limitation
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dispose the commercial banks to hold those currencies more willingly. This
process would normally gather strength in proportion to the narrowing of the
inter-Community margins.
In any event if the narrowing is slight there is reason to think that the
reserve requirements would not be modified to any extent, since they correspond
essentially to the trend of the balance of payments.
On the hypothesis that the differentiation in the inter-Community margins
would be realized by means of combined intervention in dollars and in
Community currencies a saving of reserves could be achieved to the extent
that the balances in Community currencies are not subject to daily settlement
in other means of reserve. The central banks would thus have relatively more
dollars at their disposal for operations with third countries.
It is to be noted on the one hand that intervention in Community currencies
and the retention of these in the reserves of Member States would leave
unchanged the total amount of assets held in other forms by the Community
as a whole; and on the other hand that at a more advanced stage, when there
are no longer margins of fluctuation between Community currencies, third
countries might be tempted to hold them. This could only develop if in addi-
tion changes of parity were precluded as between Community currencies and if
at the same time satisfactory investment outlets were provided for them.
In the event of a differentiation in the inter-Community margins obtained
by means of a  widening of the margin applicable to the dollar,  the movements
in the reserves might become less important, given that the Member States would
be in better position to protect themselves by variations in the rates against
inflows or outflows of dollars.
Examination of the consequences on the reserve requirements of a differen-
tiation in the inter-Community margins leads to the conclusion that the adoption
of differentiation will not necessarily entail the provision of specific credit
facilities.
(ii) Nature and management of the reserves
The repercussions in this field will depend very largely on the methods
of intervention adopted by the central banks to obtain a differentiation in the
inter-Community margins. Concerted action against the dollar alone will
bring no changes in relation to the present situation; and it will be the same if
concerted intervention is similarly effected against Community currencies but
does not lead tD holding them in the official reserves of the Member States.
Conversely, if they are so held, the central banks will have to consider
the following questions:
limits on the holding of Community currencies in the official reserves;
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on a swap basis, under the provisions of the European Monetary Agree~
ment, or by holding them in the form of units of account);
return on the reserves in Community currencies by comparison with
those held in dollars, in the form of special drawing rights, or in the form
of claims on the International Monetary Fund.
Altogether, the influences of a reduction in the inter-Community margins
on the nature and the management of the reserves should not be a difficulty.
It would even carry advantages to the extent that the retention of Community
currencies in the reserves of Member States would seem preferable to other
assets.
Rates of interest and forward rates of exchange
The examination of the repercussions of a differentiation in inter-Com-
munity margins is made on a hypothesis that ignores particular tensions due to
doubts about the parities of certain Community currencies. Such doubts
generally provoke speculative movements of capital, unpredictable and sub-
stantial, on which the width of the margin has practically no influence.
In principle, narrowing the inter-Community margins should reduce the
need for forward cover between the currencies of the Member States) Subject
to forward cover arrangements intended to guard against the risk of changes
in parity, still not perhaps totally excluded within the Community, these needs
will diminish in proportion as the margins are narrowed, and will finally
disappear.
The reduction in the need for forward cover will tend to narrow the differ-
ences between rates of interest in force in the Member States and thus reduce
the autonomy of national policies in this domain. It is to be noted on the
other hand that a widening of the margins for the dollar will increase the need
for forward cover in third currencies and the possible extent of the differences
between the rates of interest in the markets of third currencies, especially the
Eurodollar market, and the rates ruling in the markets of the EEC countries.
In consequence, a reduction in the inter-Community margins would provide
an incentive to greater uniformity in monetary policies inside the Community;
while a widening of the margins for the dollar would provide greater autonomy
and greater liberty of manreuvre in relation to other countries.
The reduction in the need for forward cover might be less in the event of 
de facto  narrowing
than an official one, since in the former case the economic agents operating in the foreign
exchange markets would not know the new limits set for the fluctuations in rates of Commu-
nity currencies.
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a reduction  in  differences in rates of interest inside the Community might
present difficulties. In fact, seeing that uniformity in national economic poli-
cies is not sufficiently assured, that interest rate policies vary  in  importance
in different member countries, and that the systems of financial relations with
foreign countries vary widely within the EEC, undesirable movements of capital
could occur, and to deal with them the Member States would be progressively
deprived of possibilities of action by the interplay of fluctuations in rates, and
they would then have to apply other measures.
T~e existence of these difficulties or dangers has led the majority of
experts to put the accent on the expediency of a progressive narrowing of
inter-Community margins, having regard, among other things, to the fact that
a slight reduction in the margins still leaves the possibility of important differ-
ences of interest rates between Member States.l On the other hand, the experts
are unanimous regarding the necessity for undertaking a study of methods making
it possible to harmonize monetary policies and the utilization of the instruments
of such policies, in order to avoid recourse to measures of control conflicting
with the smooth running of the Common Market.
Common agricultural policy
In restricting the possibilities of fluctuation in rates of Community
currencies for spot settlement and in consequence for forward operations, the
reduction in the inter-Community margins could have a beneficial effect on
the application of the common agricultural policy, notably as regards divergent
movements for products caused by slight differences in rates.
The experts, however, are not all convinced that such a favourable con-
sequence would follow. They consider that in essence the problems of agricul-
tural exchanges are bound up with other factors than the margins of fluctuation
of currency rates, in particular with institutional elements and the variations
in forward exchange rates that may occur in a period of speculation. However
that may be, a reduction in the inter-Community margins cannot have any
harmful effects on the common agricultural policy.
VIII. Institutional arrangen'tents for " CQ1zcertation
Operation
When the decision has been taken to differentiate between the Com-
munity margins and those applicable to the dollar
, "
concertation" aimed at
1 On the hypothesis that inter-community margins are reduced to :!: 1% (instead of' :!: 1.5%)
the difference between the levels of interest rates in force in the member countries for opera-
tions at three months would amount at the maximum to 8% per annum.
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first time the " Community level"  of  the dollar should be effected between the
Governors  of  the central banks  of  the Member States. In fact, such "concerta-
tion" would be a determining factor for future developments; and it is important
that it should be carefully prepared.
It would be desirable that at the moment when it is decided to put the
system into operation the rate for the dollar in terms  of  each  of  the Community
currencies is well within the "band" selected.
Once this first decision has been taken the "concertation" can be continued
either between the central banks direct or within a Community organ.
Direct ~~concertation" between central banks
1. Such "concertation" should be constant. It could take the form  of  daily
contacts between those responsible for the conduct  of  the foreign operations
of  the central banks, and it would be for them to maintain the necessary contact
with their authorities..
2. The Committee  of  Governors , informed  of  the development  of  the situa-
tion in the foreign exchange markets  of  the Community, would lay down at
their meetings the broad lines  of  the policy  of  intervention to be followed.
These would serve as a guide for the decisions to be taken from day to day by
those responsible for the conduct  of  the foreign operations.
3. The experts recognize unanimously that no grave problem should norm-
ally arise as long as the rates for the dollar in the different markets  of  the
Community remain inside the "band"
(i)
Certain problems might arise:
If the rate for the dollar vis-a.-vis a Community currency moved to th~
upper or lower limit  of  the "band" and the central bank issuing the
currency concerned desired to shift the "Community level" in order to
secure greater freedom  of  fluctuation while other central banks preferred
not to modify it. 
If the rate for the dollar against two or more currencies  of  the Community
were at opposite limits of the "band" and one central bank wished to
raise the "Community level" while another wanted to lower it.
On the former hypothesis the "concertation" body would have to decide
whether there was a case or not for shifting the "Community level" and fix the
amount  of  such movement. In the second case, it would have to come to 
decision as to the wisdom of the movement and on the amount and direction
of  the movement to be made at that level.
(ii)
S. 1 1 - 19705. In order to avoid as far as possible being taken by surprise it would be
best if "concertation" were effected as soon as the rate for the dollar in relation
to a Community currency approached too closely one  of  the limits  of  the
band" (within 0.10% 'for example).
This would provide a breathing space during which the necessary contacts
could be made.
6. In any event, if "concertation" at the level  of  those responsible for the
conduct  of  the foreign operations did not result rapidly in a decision, the
Governors would be immediately apprised  of  the situation and  whether
they were to meet or to consult by other methods  they would have to decide
on a solution  of  the problem submitted to them.
The "concertation" at whatever level it takes place must always be multi-
lateral, even if certain central banks appear not to have any direct interest
in the case in point, for the fixing  of  the "Community level", determining as it
does the position  of  the "band", is a question  of  common interest.
7. At the "concertation" all the elements  of  fact likely  to  exercise an influence
should be taken into consideration (level of reserves, duration  of  disequilibrium
noted, seasonal influences, etc.
Among these elements there are two in particular that deserve special
attention.
The first is the percentage accumulation or loss  of  reserves sustained by
the country desiring a change in the "Community level". In fact, the amount
of  these movements could provide an indication  of  the size and direction  of  the
change to be made in the "Community level"
The second is the amount and direction  of  the net global position in the
aggregate  of  the five central banks  of  the Community in relation to the
outside world.
This indication should make it possible to judge the interests  of  the
Community in relation to those  of  anyone  of  its members.
Community actions  such as recourse to the support  of  a currency at
short term  might eventually be contemplated to make up for the difficulties
entailed for certain central banks in the compromises accepted by them in the
interests  of  the Community.
8. Independently  of  the cases considered above in which it might be necessary
to change the "Community level" there may well be others in which the central
banks decide by common accord to act on the dollar rate either by raising it
or lowering it deliberately in response, for example, to the exigencies  of  monetary
policy.
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be held at Governor level.
9 . Finally, it seems necessary to undertake rapidly a study of certain problems
of  a material and technical nature of  which the following are singled out for
mention in the first place:
(i) establishment  of  a communications network permitting direct, immediate
and simultaneous contact between central banks;
unification  of  the methods  of  intervention in foreign exchange markets;
standardization  of  the opening hours  of  the markets.
(ii)
(iii)
Concert ati on through the intermediary of a Co mmu-
nity organ
Object
1. The methods described above enable the central banks to reduce progres-
sively and then to suppress the margins  of  fluctuation between Community
currencies, but they do not lead by themselves to the wider objectives required
of  an economic and monetary union which the Heads  of  State or Government
decided to establish at the Hague Conference.
2. In fact the narrowing  of  the margins, concerted intervention against
the dollar, and any intervention in Community currencies only go some way
towards ensuring the "Community management of  the operations  of  the central
banks.
Now, at the final stage  of  the economic and monetary union the necessity
has been accepted:
not only to eliminate the margins  of  fluctuation between Community
currenCIes
but also to pool and manage in common the foreign exchange reserves
of  the Community
and in addition to establish a Community authority, analogous to the
Federal Reserve Board, entitled to take decisions  of  monetary policy in
the matter  of  discount rates, bank liquidity and credit to the public and
private sectors , according to the exigencies  of  the economic situation within the Community. 
3. Accordingly it may be asked whether, among various possible ways 
realizing these objectives progressively, it would not be opportune to resort to
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Community to introduce .as soon as possible mechanisms, that by any test are
indispensable, for attaining the final stage.
The introduction may be gradual. During the first phase the accent would
be on the problem  of  coordinating intervention by the central banks with a
view to reducing fluctuations in the rates  of  exchange between their currencies;
during other phases new objectives could prompt coordinated action by the
central banks, namely the progressive realization  of  Community management
of  the reserves and  of  a Community monetary policy.
On this point the introduction at a given moment  of  a Community organ
managed by the Governors  of  the central banks might prove to be more effica-
cious in ensuring the progress to be achieved than simple "concertation" between
central banks.
In fact, this organ, situated at the centre  of  the activity of the central
banks, would have at its disposal the whole body  of  information; managed on
a collegiate basis by the Governors it would provide a better comprehension
of  the Community problems; and as it developed it would enable progress to
be made towards achieving smoothly the total suppression  of  the margins,
the management in common  of  the reserves and the elucidation  of  a really
Community" monetary policy.
It is a delicate matter to decide at what moment the establishment  of  such
an organ would be most useful. On this subject opinions may differ and the
experts , considering it is a question  of  a political option rather than a technical
question, have nothing to say in the matter.
They think, however, that on the assumption that the creation  of  such an
organ would be accepted, it would he necessary to realize it in several successive
phases depending on the experience acquired , the degree  of  harmonization
attained in economic policy and the closeness  of  the cooperation developed
between central banks.
Creation of a Community organ
As has been said above, the establishment  of  such an organ would he
effected in successive phases spread over a period. These phases would not
necessarily coincide with the "stages" referred to in Mr Werner s report. They
might, according to circumstances, be shorter than, equal to or longer than
those.
The passage from one phase to another would depend in particular on
the progress achieved on the economic front and on the ease or difficulty with
which the system operates, so facilitating the transition to the next phase.
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In the first phase "concertation" would be effected directly between
the central banks, which would every day inform an "agent of  the balance
of  exchange operations effected. This would enable the "agent" to centralize
and sum up the total  of  operations effected. He would inform each central
bank, which would thus have a documentary basis that would considerably
assist "concertation
The introduction  of  this first phase would go hand in hand with the
direct concertation between central banks" described in section B above.
Second phase
In a second phase the "agent" would suggest possible transfers between
central banks in currencies  of  the Community and in dollars, a central bank
A" holding currency "B" exchanging it with another central bank "C" against
currency "D" or dollars.
These operations would also enable a central bank to exchange a Com-
munity .currency that it was holding against its own currency held by .another
central bank.
The operations envisaged in this second phase do not in principle entai'
any granting  of  credit. They could equally be undertaken concurrently with
the "direct concertation between central banks" described in section B above
for example at the moment when it is decided to intervene jointly in dollars and
in Community currencies.
Third phase
In this third phase the "agent" would favour the inter-Community mobility
of  the dollars accumulated within the Community: he would operate in such a
way that dollars accumulated by one or more central banks would be put at
the disposal  of  central banks short  of  dollars. A pool  of  dollars at the outset
would not be essential and the system would only operate to the extent that
deficits and surpluses  of  dollars occurred within the Community. The claims
and liabilities established in this way would be guaranteed against exchange
risks and could be settled at prescribed intervals either in dollars or in other
reserve instruments.
That would not oblige the "agent" to open accounts in units  of  account
at the central banks. Those that handed over dollars would show among their
assets a bilateral claim guaranteed against exchange risks on the borrowing
central bank.
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recourse to the system of monetary support at short term, which however
entails its own methods of intervention and control.1 They would not neces-
sarily be obligatory. There might be an advantage at any given moment in
making them obligatory when cohesion within the Community has been
sufficiently reinforced.
These operations would be submitted to normal processes of consultation.
Their advantage would be the better to equalize the position in dollars within
the Community and to avoid the accumulation of dollars by certain countries
while others q.re losing them so showing a position of double disequilibrium
in relation to the United States while the Community as a whole would be in
equilibrium.
Although entailing the granting of credit, which would be on a bilateral
basis, the operations envisaged in the third phase  especially if they were not
obligatory  could go hand in hand with the "direct concertation between
central banks" described in B above.
Fourth phase
1. In the preceding phases the role of "agent" has been limited to assembling
information on the 'operations and suggesting transfers or compensation
transactions. He only effects statistical registrations, holds no part of the
reserves and exercises no action that could put pressure on the central banks.
On embarking on the fourth phase an important advance would be made.
The role of "agent" would be replaced by a "Community organ" the func-
tions of which would be appreciably different.
The experience acquired and the progress realized in the matter of harmoni-
zation of economic policies, in the same way as that recorded in the cooperation
constantly reaffirmed by the central banks, would decide the moment at
which it would be possible to embark on this fourth phase.
2. The fourth phase would be characterized by the creation of a Community
organ placed under the authority of the Governors. It could be instituted
either by the central banks or by inter-governmental agreement, the execution
of which would be entrusted to the central banks according to legal formulae
to be examined later. The role of this organ would be to emphasize the Com-
munity character of the actions undertaken in the preceding phases, to establish
1 It is well to recall three characteristics of this system:
grant of credit on an "ad hoc" basis,
financing founded on a quota basis,
inauguration of a procedure of special consultation.
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exchange operations, to permit standardization of reserve policies leading up
to a progressive pooling of reserves, and to facilitate the gradual establishment
of a Community monetary policy.
The Community organ to be formed, being called on to retain and manage
a part, at the outset a small one, of the reserves of the central banks, will be
referred to henceforth as the "Fund"
Its first duties would be aimed essentially at a simple regularization of
foreign exchange operations.. With the development and progress realized
towards the creation of an economic and monetary union, its functions would
expand until it gradually became the organ conducting the Community manage-
ment of the reserves, when it would confer on the Council of Governors, which
would assume control of it, a role analogous and an authority similar to those
of the Federal Reserve Board.
The Fund could work on the following general lines:
(i) The operations of the Fund would be expressed in units of acc;:ount based
on gold, defined in such a way as to indicate the indiyiduality of the EEc.
(ii) The Fund would be furnished with an adequate reserve by transfers of
dollars or other reserve elements from the central banks which, by way of
counterpart, would be credited in units of account.
The central banks would not be in the position of shareholders in the
Fund but would hold part of their net reserves in the form of a credit balance
guaranteed by the Fund. In addition, the Fund could, in case of need, be similar~
ly furnished with Community currencies.
(iii) The central banks would intervene in their foreign exchange markets
in dollars or in Community currencies, within the framework of the directives
laid down by "concertation , all freedom of action being safeguarded as long as
the rates for the dollar in the different markets in the Community remained
within the Community "band"
- (iv) The intervention balances in the markets, in dollars or in Community
currencies, would be "transferred" each evening to the Fund against a credit
of units of account in the case of a surplus, or "drawn" from the Fund against
a debit of units of account in the event of a deficit. These payments or drawings
of Community currencies would similarly give rise to an entry to the debit or
credit of the central bank issuing them. In this way the accounts of the Fund
would systematically record the movement in the reserves resulting from inter-
ventions in the market.
(v) The positions in account with the Fund would be subject to settlement
at intervals to be agreed (daily, monthly or quarterly). Intervening settlements
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at any given moment, a maximum sum to be determined. The credits between
member countries represented by the appearance of positions on their accounts
bearing different signs could be substituted for the mechanism of monetary
support at short term and could be used in conjunction with financial assistance
at medium term, for example, to ensure their elimination.
(vi) The Fund would be managed by a "Council of Governors of central
banks . This Council would ensure "concertation" in a similar manner to
that described in section B and according to the same principles, but its
activities would be extended progressively from the simple establishment of
the "Community level" to questions relating to the management in common
of the reserves and the coordination of the monetary policies.
This development assumes in particular a previous study of conditions
for harmonization of the use of the instruments of monetary policy; it also
ass urnes a genuine will, with political backing, to arrive at a real Community
management in everything that concerns the action of the central banks.
Progress in these directions should go hand in hand with that realized
on the plane of harmonization of short-term and medium-term economic policies.
4. (i) This formula does not deprive the central banks of any of their prerogatives;
from the moment that the "concertation" described in section B is accepted
greater cooperation between them becomes necessary. That this is effected
in the form of the management of a "Fund" does not entail any new
restriction on their liberty of action but offers on the contrary the advantage
of getting them more used every day to being aware of the primacy of
Community interests over those of a purely national nature.
(ii) The Fund would make it possible to determine automatically from day
to day the variation in the official exchange reserves of each member country,
and consequently to detect rapidly the appearance of any disequilibrium reflected
in the external payments situation of certain countries. It would then be possible
to examine to what extent the position was counterbalanced by the develop-
ment of the foreign assets and liabilities of the commercial banks or was due to
a disturbance of the balance of payments. This examination effected at
Community level would make it possible to intervene in time with a member
country so that it could adopt the measures of adjustment necessary and
conform to the needs of harmonization of economic policy.
(iii) The adoption of a unit of account would confirm . the autonomy
of the Community. Created and defined at the time of the constitution
of the Fund, the use of this unit of account could be extended to
private transactions and in particular to the new issues effected in the markets
of the member countries of the Community.
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requirements would be retained by the Fund instead  of  being distributed among
the central banks. The employment  of  these dollars would be negotiated at
the Community level and would cease to be the subject  of  bilateral arrangements.
(v) The establishment  of  the Fund would put in their place in an embryonic
form, but one susceptible  of  development, the instruments and mechanisms
necessary for the exercise  of  the functions that would evolve at a later stage
into an organism  of  the Federal Reserve Board type, in particular the
Community management  of  foreign exchange relations with foreign countries
and the management  of  the reserves. The Fund would make it possible to
attain this last phase of the process by a progressive development  of  techniques
and practices.
(vi) Finally, the establishment  of  the Fund would be a tangible manifestation
of  the Community s will to integrate. 
(vii) The creation  of  the Fund and its successive developments, in particular
the extent to which it decided on a progressive increase in the proportion 
the reserves to be managed on a common basis, corresponding to the grant
through its intermediary  of  reciprocal credits, would go hand in hand with the
progress realized in the matter  of  harmonization  of  economic policies. Its
action, however , in the immediate detection  of  positions  of  disequilibrium and
the necessity that would arise from its very existence  of  restoring excessive credit
or debit positions to a normal level, would constitute an important element
making it possible to obtain more rapidly from the member countries the neces-
sary decisions in the m;;ltter  of  economic policy in order to achieve closer
alignment  of  this policy within the Community.
5. The experts consider, without however pronouncing on the political expe-
diency  of  creating a "Fund" or on the date on which this could come into opera-
tion, that it would be useful to continue the examination  of  it on a basis at
once deeper and more extensive in conjunction with other studies, notably
those aimed at the harmonization  of  monetary policies.
Conclusions
On the conclusion  of  their studies the experts consider that on the
technical plane it would be possible, in reply to the questions raised by
Mr Werner, to envisage the following gradual process, which presupposes
that sufficient progress would at the same time be made in the harmonization
of  economic policies:
1) A first step towards the establishment  of  specific system  of  foreign
excha?-ge in the Community would be for the central banks acting in concert
1 1 - 1970to restrict "in fact" the fluctuations between their currencies within narrower
margins than those resulting from the application of the margins in force for
the dollar. The objective would be achieved by concerted action in relation
to the dollar.
2) In a second phase, a reduction in the margins would be announced and
concerted action would be undertaken in relation to the dollar, which would
be completed eventually by intervention in Community currencies at the limit
of the margins.
3) At a later stage concerted action in relation to the dollar might be
supplemented by intervention in Community currencies at the limit of and
within the margins.
4) The adoption of the action described in 2) and 3) above could be accom-
panied by recourse to an "agent , who might be the BIS, to whom would be
entrusted the task of recording the balances of the operations effected in the
markets of the member countries of the Community, of aggregating them and
notifying them every day to each central bank, and of suggesting the possible
transfers in Community currencies and in dollars, as well  if the central
banks agree to grant one another bilateral credits  as the compensating
operations in dollars.
5) As soon as the techniques described in 1) to 4) above are working normally
and without friction, which a,ssumes a closer harmonization of economic policies
it would seem to be technically possible to pass on to the phase characterized
by the establishment of a "Fund"
The experts think that the study in depth of the conditions of creation
and operation of this Fund is worth undertaking, in conjunction with other
studies, notably those aimed at the harmonization of monetary policies.
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LETTER FROM Mr WERNER TO BARON ANSIAUX
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF GOVERNORS OF THE
CENTRAL BANKS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EEC
12 June 1970
During its meeting of 9 June, the Council of Ministers of the European
Communities took cognizance of the interim report on the realization of
economic and monetary union which I presented to it on that occasion. The
Council took note of the conclusions in the report. It appears from the debates
that the fundamental objectives described in the document met with agreement
from the Governments. Nevertheless, the Council has stated that it is desirable
to go more deeply into certain aspects of the suggestions made, notably as regards
the steps to be taken in the course of the first stage.
On the one hand, it seems necessary to present concrete recommenda-
tions in the matter of economic and monetary policy.
On the other hand, as regards the progress to be accomplished in the
monetary field, the Council of Ministers would wish to be more fully
informed on certain technical and economic aspects of the proposals presented
to it.
Chapters I
to VII and
VIII except
4th phase
Like other colleagues who have expressed this view, I consider that on
this point it would be fitting to have an opinion from the Committee of
Governors of the central banks. I should therefore be grateful if you would
invite the Committee over which you preside to send me its views on the
following questions:
(i) What in the first stage would be the features of a specific
foreign exchange regime peculiar to the currencies of the
Member States? In particular, what would be the advantages
and disadvantages both on the economic plane and on the
monetary plane of a restriction of the margins between the
currencies of the member countries of the Common Market;
and what would they be in the event of the dollar no longer
being utilized as the intervention currency, which would
reduce the possibilities of fluctuation from 3% to 11/2% at
the maximum?
References to the "Report on questions put by the  ad hoc  Committee presided over by
Mr Werner.
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Section C 2)
4th phase
Chapter VIII
Sections B
and C 2)
except 4th
phase
(ii) , As regards the establishment  of  foreign exchange
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ailing the creation  of  such a fund during the first stage or a
subsequent stage I should like to know what can and should
be done here and now with a view to tightening the monetary
bonds uniting the member countries  of  the Community and
to enable it to finish up with the creation 
of  a monetary regime
based on the constitution  of  a "European Reserve Board" and
a "European Reserve Fund" in the period laid dow
of  ten
years.
(iii) Independently  of  the two preceding questions it 
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l monetary policy now at their disposal.
In or..ier to permit the Group over which I preside to draw firmly based
and realistic conclusions from the mass of information furnished, I should be
particularly grateful  if  you would ensure that the replies, even if they conflict
are as precise as possible and supported by pertinent arguments raised by one
side or the other.
I am aware  of  the special effort that I am calling for from the members
of  the Committee, since these questions will demand a 
very high degree 
concertation and concentrated study. However, you will not fail to appreciate
the political necessities that oblige my Group to present its final report in the
month of September. For this reason I should be obliged if you would ensure
that your Committee presents its report to me by 15 July at the latest.
Thanking the members of the Committee in advance for their best en~
deavours in response to this letter
I have the honour to be your obedient servant.
(signed) Pierre WERNER
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QUESTIONS PUT BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE
PRESIDED OVER BY Mr WERNER
I. Reduction in margins for fluctuations between Commu-
nity currencies
Chapter V, 1)
Cp.apter VIII
Sections A
Band C 
1st phase
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Section 1) a)
Chapter VII,
Section 1) a)
Chapter VII
Section 1) b)
Chapter VII
Section 2)
Chapter VII
Section 3)
Chapter IV
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1. In what way could a preliminary phase be introduced
without a definitive undertaking being entered into immed-
iately, for example by informal arrangements between the
central banks regarding the coordination of their day-to-day
interventions in the foreign exchange market?
2. In the event of an engagement to reduce the margins of
fluctuation being taken: what would be the advantages and
. disadvantages that would result from the different possibilities
presented by the intervention techniques (for example, inter-
vention with regard to all the other currencies of the Member
States; standardized intervention in relation to the dollar) ?
3. Would the reduction in the margins of fluctuation
necessitate the granting of specific credit facilities .
4. What are the repercussions on the reserve requirements
that would arise on the one hand from a reduction in the
margin of fluctuation as such, and on the other hand from the
establishment of a system of compensation and granting of
credit which might possibly result from it? Would interven-
cion in relation to the whole of the currencies of the Member
States also have repercussions on the nature and management
of the reserves?
( 5. What would be the consequences of a reduction in the
\ margins of fluctuation: a) on the relations between rates of
inter est and the po !icy for interest rates in the Member States?
b) of the movement of forward rates on the policy of exchange
rates in relation to other countries?
c) on the application of the agricultural policy?
6. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a
progressive reduction in the margin of fluctuation between
the currencies of the Member States as opposed to the suppres-
sion of the margins at one stroke once the convergence of eco-
nomic policies between the Member States has progressed
sufficiently?Chapter VIII
Section B
Chapter VIII
Section C 2)
4th phase 3)
and 4)
Chapter VIII
Section C 2)
. 4th phase
4) b) and g)
Chapter VIII
Section C 2)
4th phase 3)
b), d) and e)
Chapter VIII
Section C 2)
4th phase
3) e)
Cha pter VIII
Section C 2)
4th phase
4) c) and d)
Chapter II
Chapter VII
1) a)
Chapter VIII
Section C 2)
4th phase 4)
a) b) e) and g)
II. Exchange regularization fund
1. Is the creation  of  an exchange regularization fund essen-
tial in the event  of  a reduction in the margins  of  fluctuation
between member countries? Would an exchange regulariza-
f tion fund 
facilitate the current intervention that might turn
out to be necessary in the national foreign exchange markets,
and in what way?
2. To what extent is it considered that movements on
accounts in the exchange regularization fund would serve as
a warning signal  of  incipient disequilibrium in foreign trade
more surely and rapidly than other indications  of  the trend 
foreign trade (for example, foreign exchange positions).
f 3. 
To what extent and in what way would it be necessary
1 ~:~r
~;~:;fu:~~:~1~ ~~%a:~~:;o =:e
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4. What would be the relationship between these lines 
credit and the credit mechanisms at short and medium term
existing or in course  of  preparation within the EEC? Is it
possible that, if the need arose, the necessary lines  of  credit
needed for settlements within the .exchange regularization fund
would coincide with the lines  of  credit provided in application
of  the other mechanisms? 
5. To what extent would the independence  of  the currencies
of  the member countries vis-a.-vis the dollar be increased by
the fact that the settlement  of  balances  of  exchange operations
is effected through a regularization fund instead  of  being
effected on the bilateral plane or by a technical financial agent
(for example the BIS) ? 
To what extent would such independence be reinforced
l by 
a reduction or the suppression  of  the margins?
r 6. What are the possibilities for a better coordination 
I monetary 
policies by the member countries as a result  of  the
existence  of  an exchange regularization fund? In particular
what would be the advantage  of  such coordination in relation
to arrangements permitting better consultation and a higher
degree  of  coordination within the Committee  of  Governors 
the central banks?
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Section C 2)
4th phase
4) b) d)
Cha pter VIII
Section C 2)
4th phase
3) d) and e)
Chapter VIII
Section C 2)
4th phase
3) c)
Chapter VIII
Section C 2)
4th phase
3) and 4)
Chapter VIII
Section B
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I 7, What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a
I complete or 
partial centralization of the currency reserves of
the member countries with an exchange regularization fund;
what would be the consequences of this for intervention in
dollars or other third currencies effected on national markets?
In particular, could or should such intervention in relation to
the dollar in national markets be effected by the regularization
fund and according to what technical procedure?
f 8 
. - 
What would be the essential tasks delegated to the
1 exchange 
regularization fund? How would it be managed?
9. Failing the establishment of an exchange regularization
fund, according to what techniques could cooperation in
foreign exchange matters be effectively reinforced between the
member countries of the Community during the first stage?Annex 
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
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The Committee has held six sessions: 25 June, 1 and 2 July, 9 July, 16 July,
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S. 11 - 1970